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The weight of authority appears to recognize the availability of
estoppel as a defense under a statute such as that involved here by
which such sales are not made void but voidable at the election
of the purchaser . . . .The majority of the cases, and we feel the
better reason, hold that under statutes worded as the Florida
Statute is framed, estoppel may be a defense and we follow and
apply that rule in this case.
21
The facts through which the trial court found conduct amounting
to an estoppel were left undiscussed by the appellate court.22 It deferred
in its review to those "applicable authorities '" 23 cited in its opinion, most
of which had held, in varying degrees, that direct participation by the pur-
chaser in the business affairs of a corporate vendor was conduct sufficient
to estop any later action of rescission.
24
Properly viewed, the contention that the Blue Sky Laws were enacted
solely for the protection of the investing public is not tenable. Very rarely
is all the right on one side. Rather, it would seem that these laws were
passed to regularize and make more secure the business of selling securities,
much as insurance laws regulate the sale of insurance. To do this, protections
must be extended to both contracting parties, and both must conform to
similar standards of fair dealing. If the legal protections were all on one
side and the standards of conduct were legislatively unbalanced, then
remedial action protecting the seller of securities would soon be necessary.
It is far better that this result be achieved within the existing legal frame-
work than to rely on piecemeal legislation.
HERBERT STETTIN
VENUE - CONTRACT FOR
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY
The plaintiff-vendor filed a complaint and good faith affidavit in the
Circuit Court of Manatee County, seeking specific performance of a contract
for the sale of realty located in Manatee County. The defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the residence of the parties
and the transaction giving rise to the action were both situated in Pinellas
21. Popper v. Havana Publications, Inc., 122 So.2d 247, 248 (Fla. App. 1960).
22. Id. at 249.
23. Popper v. Havana Publications, Inc., 122 So.2d 247 (Fla. App. 1960).
24. De Lamar Mines of Mont. v. Mackay, 104 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1939); Brown
Memorial Foundation v. Robrer, 152 Kan. 291, 103 P.2d 814 (1940); Fitch v. United
Royalty Co., 143 Kan. 486, 55 P.2d 409 (1936); Kaye v. Sunbeam Quarries Co., 258
Ky. 190, 79 S.W.2d 700 (1935); De Polo v. Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441
1954); Moore v. Manufacturers Sales Co., 335 Mich. 606, 56 N.W.2d 397 (1953);
chrier v. B & B Oil Co., 311 Mich. 118, 18 N.W.2d 392 (1945); Thomas v. United
Royalty Co., 180 Okla. 230, 68 P.2d 490 (1937).
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County. Upon a denial of the motion, an interlocutory appeal was taken.'
Held, reversed: the action sought primarily money damages and hence was
transitory. Therefore the proper venue was in "Pinellas County where the
parties all live and where the cause of action accrued. ' 2 McMullen v.
McMullen, 122 So.2d 626 (Fla. App. 1960).
Florida's venue statute provides that an action may be commenced
in the county where (1) the defendant resides, (2) the cause of action
accrued, or (3) where the property in litigation is located. At first glance,
this statute seems clear and unambiguous. The principal case, however,
introducing the common law rule of local and transitory actions into its
interpretation, enunciates a refinement which could materially affect the
laying of venue under the statute.
The distinction between local and transitory actions is an historical one.
4
Actions have been held to be local if founded upon a transaction which
could only have occurred in a particular place, while transitory actions are
ones which could, in theory, happen anywhere.5 Thus, tort and contract
actions which seek relief in the form of money damages generally have
been held to be transitory," while proceedings in rem and actions which affect
a right, title or interest in land are local and maintainable only in the juris-
diction where the property is located. 7 The inequities which may spring from
this rule can be seen by a consideration of Livingston v. Jefferson,8 the land-
mark American case which enunciated the distinction between local and
transitory actions. In this case an action for trespass quare clausum fregit
was held to be local,9 and maintainable only in the jurisdiction where the
property was located. The defendant under threat of an impending law suit,
naturally avoided this jurisdiction and the plaintiff was thereby precluded
from asserting a claim. The rationale of the rule that trespass to land is
local is based on the fact that a determination of title to the land may be
1. On the authority of FLA. App. R. 4.2(a): "Appeals from interlocutory orders
or decrees entered after final decree and orders at common law relating to venue or
jurisdiction over their person, may be prosecuted in accordance with this rule."
2. Though the language of the statute is in the disjunctive "or," the court's use of
the conjunctive "and" was no doubt prompted by the fact that the residence of the
parties and accrual of the transaction were within the same county.
3. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1959). "Suits shall be begun only in the county . ..
where the defendant resides, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property
in litigation is located."
4. For a brief but illuminating discussion of the historical aspects see, SCOTT,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE 18-22 (1922).
5. Board of Public Instruction v. First Nat'l Bank, 111 Fla. 4, 143 So.
738 (1932); Barnett v. National Sur. Corp., 195 Miss. 528, 15 So.2d 775 (1943);
Powell v. Eastern Carolina Regional Housing Authority, 251 N.C. 812, 112 S.E.2d 386
(1960).
6. Peiser v. Mettler, 50 Cal.2d 594, 328 P.2d 953 (1958); Miller v. Batten,
273 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1954); Vaughan v. Womeldorf, 366 Pa. 262, 77 A.2d 424 (1951).
7. Etter v. Vollmer, 139 Cal. App.2d 718, 294 P.2d 55 (1956); Raynolds v. Row,
184 Kan. 791, 339 P.2d 358 (1959).
8. 1 Brock 203, 15 Fed. Cas. 660 (No. 8411) (C.C.D. Va. 1811).
9. A result which was first reached in the old English case of Doulson v. Matthews,
4 T.R. 503, 100 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1792).
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necessary. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that an
action for conversion of timber severed from the plaintiff's land was transi-
tory, and this in the face of a denial by the defendant of the plaintiff's
ownership of the land in question. 10 Stare decisis is not such an inexorable
doctrine" as to be binding on a court when the reason for the law ceases
to exist. 12 Since title to land may be investigated by a foreign court in a
conversion action, it seems inconsistent to deny a plaintiff, in a trespass
action, the same privilege in support of a mere technicality of the law.
This distinction though long abolished by the English who created it,'3
has been followed almost without exception by American courts. One
notable exception is the Supreme Court of Minnesota. In Little v. Chicago,
St. P., M. 6 0. Ry.,' 4 the court was faced with this same question of
whether an action, admittedly local, could be maintained when the
property was located out of the state.1" A majority of the court was not
awed by the great weight of authority to the contrary and rejected the
distinction in terse and unequivocal language.'6 Ohio, in the interest of
justice, has also rejected the distinction as applied to actions within the
state.'7 Except in certain specified cases, service of process in Ohio cannot
be effected upon a person without the county of the issuing court. Since
a person could evade any suit held to be local by simply avoiding the county
where the property was located, the Ohio courts have rejected the local-
transitory distinction, holding that an action which under the common
law would be deemed local, can be brought in any county of the state.
The first' substantial move in Florida toward the adoption of the local
action rule was in Florida v. Jacksonville, P. & M. R.R.,'9 where the court held
that a circuit judge may not appoint a receiver to take possession of property
in another county. Though no mention was made of local actions, this limi-
10. Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897).
11. "The doctrine of stare decisis was never intended to tie the hands of a
Supreme Court and prevent it from ...making adjustments in the law to meet the
needs of people who must rely on the courts for the protection of their interests."
Green, Freedom of Litigation, 38 ILL. L. Rrv. 117, 118 (1944), quoted in Kamau &
Cushnie v. Hawaii County, 41 Hawaii 527, 551 (1957).
12. "When reasons for the law fail, the law should fall, particularly so when the
law was supplied by the decisions of the court and relate to procedure and not to
substantive rights." Cottrell v. Amerkan, 160 Fla. 390, 393, 35 So.2d 383, 384 (1948).
13. Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77; 26 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND,
Practice and Procedure § 167 (2d ed. 1937).
14. 65 Minn. 48, 67 N.W. 846 (1896).
15. In this case the defendant railroad had allegedly caused injury to the plaintiff's
land situated in another state.
16. "We recognize the respect due to judicial precedents, and the authority of
the doctrine of stare decisis; but, inasmuch as this rule is in no sense a rule of property
and as it is purely technical, wrong in principle, and in practice often results in a total
denial of justice, and has been so generally criticised by eminent jurists, we do not feel
bound to adhere to it. ... 65 Minn. 48, 53, 67 N.W. 846, 847 (1896).
17. Genin v. Grier, 10 Ohio 209 (1840).
18. A discussion of the local action rule may be noted in McMillan v. Lacy, 6 Fla.
526 (1855). The case however, was decided on grounds not requiring an application
of the rule, and is thus no authority for the local-transitory distinction.
19. 15 Fla. 201, 285 (1875).
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tation on the power of courts to affect property in other jurisdictions was the
precursor of Florida's complete adoption of the rule. The court admitted
that this was a common law rule and susceptible to change by legislation in
certain cases, but specifically refused to comment on what these cases might
be. One of the earliest cases actually predicated upon the local action rule
was Lakeland Ideal Farm 6 Drainage Dist. v. Mitchell,20 which held that
the local action rule precluded suit for a trespass to land in a county other
than where the property was located. The court further held that this was
not one of the cases alluded to in Florida v. Jacksonville, P. 6 M. R.R.,2 '
where legislative enactments such as Florida's venue statute22 may alter the
common law rule.
Though no mention was made by name, the court in the principal case
was obviously mindful of the Lakeland Ideal Farm holding.2 3 The failure to
apply the "property in litigation" portion of the venue statute to the realty
plaintiff sought to convey makes it evident that the case was decided on a
common law rule, not altered by the statute. Since the action in the prin-
cipal case was held to be transitory, it could be maintained in any county if
not limited by other statutory provisions. 24 It has been said by the Florida
Supreme Court that in an action in personam property is not drawn into
litigation.2 5 However, in Tampa 6 1. Ry. v. Trammell,26 where an action
was commenced to compel a conveyance of land situated in several different
counties to the plaintiff, the defendants' plea of special privilege to be sued
in the county of their residence was overruled; venue was held to be proper in
any county in which a portion of the property to be conveyed was located.
Though the question of whether the property was in litigation was not
specifically raised, it is apparent that the issue was decided sub silentio.
While it may be noted that the principal case involves the converse situation,
the plaintiff attempting to convey land and therefore seeking relief in the
form of purchase price, a distinction of the cases on this ground does not
seem reasonable. If property is in litigation in a transitory action for specific
performance when the plaintiff is seeking land, it is difficult to perceive how
the nature of the property would change in the same type of action merely
because the plaintiff is seeking money. Since the only effect of such a refine-
ment is to make a nullity of the "property in litigation" portion of the statute
except in local actions, the sounder interpretation would seem to hold that
the property is in litigation in both cases.
20. 97 Fla. 890, 122 So. 516 (1929).
21. 15 Fla. 201 (1875).
22. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1959).
23. 97 Fla. 890, 122 So. 516 (1929).
24. "[A] suit on a transitory action may now be brought in any county and service
had in any other county, except for other provisions of our statutes limiting the place
where suits may be brought, or giving the defendant the privilege of being sued in a
particular county." Linger v. Balfour, 102 Fla. 591, 592, 136 So. 433 (1931).
25. 25 Fla. 1, 6 So. 160 (1889).
26. 70 Fla. 409, 70 So. 400 (1915).
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The fact that in some instances the application of the local action rule
can be supported by reason is not to be denied. Certainly, if a court can
exercise no power over property outside its jurisdiction, there is no reason
for it to entertain a suit concerning such property.27 Another application of
the local action rule which has basis in reason may be observed in suits
against municipalities. The need for public officials to administer the
duties of their office has given rise to the policy that municipalities may
be sued only in their own jurisdiction. 28 It is submitted, therefore, that the
local-transitory rule itself, which can lead to naught but confusion or
injustice should be subjected to a re-evaluation, and applied only in those
cases which can be supported by sound reason.
JAMES H. SWEENY, III
27. See Georgia Cas. Co. v. O'Donnell, 109 Fla. 290, 147 So. 267 (1933).
28. St. Petersburg v. Earle, 109 So.2d 388 (Fla. App. 1959).
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